Abstract. Unconditionally secure multi-party computations in general, and broadcast in particular, are impossible if any third of the players can be actively corrupted and if no additional information-theoretic primitive is given. In this paper, we relativize this pessimistic result by showing that such a primitive can be as simple as noisy communication channels between the players or weakly correlated pieces of information. We consider the scenario where three players have access to random variables X, Y , and Z, respectively, and give the exact condition on the joint distribution PXY Z under which unconditional broadcast is possible. More precisely, we show that this condition characterizes the possibility of realizing so-called pseudo-signatures between the players. As a consequence of our results, we can give conditions for the possibility of achieving unconditional broadcast between n players and any minority of cheaters and, hence, general multi-party computation under the same condition.
Motivation and Preliminaries

Introduction
Digital signatures [11, 19] are a powerful tool not only in the context of digital contract signing, but also as a basic primitive for cryptographic protocols such as electronic voting or secure multi-party computation. Much less known are so-called pseudo-signature schemes, which guarantee unconditional security-in contrast to classical digital-signature schemes. The inherent price for their higher security, however, is the signatures' limited transferability: Whereas classical signatures can be arbitrarily transfered without losing conclusiveness, pseudosignatures only remain secure for a fixed number λ-the transferability-of transfers among different parties. Since the necessary number of signature transfers in a protocol is typically bounded by the number of involved parties, pseudosignatures are, nevertheless, useful and offer a provably higher security level than traditional signature schemes. For example, the authenticated broadcast protocol in [13] can be based on pseudo-signatures and then guarantees unconditional (instead of computational) security against any number of corrupted players [25] .
A pseudo-signature scheme among a number of players can either be set up by a mutually trusted party, by a protocol among the players when given global broadcast channels, or-as we will show-by exploiting an information source that provides the players with certain correlated pieces of information-a similar model has been considered in [21] in the context of secret-key agreement.
In this paper, we consider the general case of an information source that provides a set of n players with pieces of information distributed according to some given joint probability distribution. For the case of three players, we completely characterize when such an information source allows for setting up a pseudosignature scheme. This result can be used for deriving a complete characterization of when unconditionally secure three-party computation-or broadcast, in particular-is achievable in the presence of an actively corrupted player. Furthermore, we give, in the same model, a sufficient condition for the achievability of unconditionally secure multi-party computation for any number n of players secure against t < n/2 actively corrupted players.
Context and Previous Work
Pseudo-signature schemes (PSS). The first pseudo-signature-like scheme was given in form of an information-checking protocol among three players [26] . In contrast to real pseudo-signatures, however, the signer is required to commit to her input value already during the setup of the scheme.
The first PSS was introduced in [7] with the restriction to be secure only with respect to a correct signer. In [25] , finally, a complete PSS was proposed for any transferability λ and any number of corrupted players.
Setting up a PSS. It was shown in [25] how to set up a PSS using global broadcast channels, where the dining-cryptographers protocol [5, 4] was used. Obtaining a PSS from a common random source was considered in [15, 16] , but only with respect to three players and one particular probability distribution.
Broadcast. The broadcast problem was introduced in [20] . It was proven that, in the standard model with secure channels between all pairs of players, but without the use of a signature scheme, broadcast is achievable if and only if the number t of cheaters satisfies t < n/3. Furthermore, it was shown that when additionally a signature scheme is given among the n players, then computationally secure broadcast is achievable for any number of corrupted players. The first efficient such protocol was given in [12] . In [25] , an efficient protocol was given with unconditional security based on a pseudo-signature scheme with transferability t + 1.
Multi-party computation (MPC).
Broadcast-or the availability of signatures with sufficiently high transferability-is a limiting factor for general multi-party computation introduced in [27] . A complete solution with respect to computational security was given in [18] . In [2, 6] , it was shown that in a model with only pairwise secure channels, MPC unconditionally secure against an active adversary is achievable if and only if t < n/3 players are corrupted. As shown in [1, 26] , t < n/2 is achievable when global broadcast channels are additionally given-and this bound was shown tight. A protocol more efficient than those in [1, 26] was given in [10] .
Our Results
We first consider a set of three players, connected in pairs by secure channels, where an additional information source provides the players with correlated pieces of information. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on the joint probability distribution of this side information for when a pseudo-signature scheme can be set up among the three players with a designated signer. Furthermore, we show that the tight condition for the achievability of broadcast or multi-party computation among three players unconditionally secure against one actively corrupted player is exactly the same as the one for a pseudo-signature scheme with respect to an arbitrary. The derived condition shows that pseudosignature schemes and broadcast among three players are possible under much weaker conditions than previously known.
We further consider the general case of n players, connected in pairs by secure channels, where, again, an additional information source provides the players with side information. For this model, and under the assumption that an active adversary can corrupt up to t < n/2 players, we show that MPC is possible under much weaker conditions than previously known.
Model and Definitions
We consider a set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } of n players that are connected by a complete, synchronous network of pairwise secure channels-in the presence of an active adversary who can select up to t players and corrupt them in an arbitrary way. Furthermore, we assume this adversary to be computationally unbounded. A player which does not get corrupted by the adversary is called correct.
Pseudo-Signatures.
We follow the definition of pseudo-signature schemes as given in [25] . Definition 1. A pseudo-signature scheme (PSS) with transferability λ among the players P 1 , . . . , P n , where P 1 is the signer, satisfies the following properties.
Correctness. If player P 1 is correct and signs a message, then a correct player P i accepts this message from P 1 except with small probability.
Unforgeability. A correct player P i rejects any message that has not been signed by P 1 except with small probability. Transferability. A message signed by the correct player P 1 can be transfered λ times, e.g., via
such that we have for each j ≤ λ and correct players P ij and P ij+1 that if P ij accepts a message m, then P ij+1 accepts the same message except with small probability.
If the path i 1 , . . . , i λ+1 can be arbitrary, we call the scheme a PSS with arbitrary transfer paths, if the transfer is restricted to a specific path i 1 , . . . , i λ+1 , we call it a PSS with transfer path i 1 , . . . , i λ+1 .
The choice λ = 1 will be sufficient in our case since any such PSS allows for broadcast for t < n/2 corrupted players [17] .
Broadcast and Multi-Party Computation. Broadcast is the problem of having a (possibly corrupted) sender distribute a value to every player such that all correct players are guaranteed to receive the same value.
Definition 2. A protocol among players P 1 , . . . , P n , where P 1 is the sender and holds input x s , and where every player P i computes an output y i , achieves broadcast if it satisfies the following conditions.
Validity. If the sender P 1 is correct, then every correct player P i computes the output y i = x s . Consistency. All correct players P i and P j compute the same output value, i.e., y i = y j holds.
Broadcast is a special case of the more general problem of multi-party computation (MPC), where the players want to evaluate in a distributed way some given function of their inputs and hereby guarantee privacy of these inputs as well as correctness of the computed result. From a qualitative point of view, the security of multi-party computation is often broken down to the conditions privacy, correctness, robustness, and fairness. In [8] , it was shown that all these conditions can only be satisfied simultaneously if t < n/2 holds-the case to which we restrict our considerations in this paper.
Dependent Parts and Simulation of Random Variables
In this section we introduce the notion of the dependent part of a random variable with respect to another, and a certain simulatability condition, defined for a triple of random variables. The dependent part of X from Y isolates the part of X that is dependent on Y . Note that we always assume that the joint distribution is known to all the players. Definition 3. Let X and Y be two random variables, and let
The random variable X Y is a function of X and takes on the value of the conditional probability distribution P Y |X=x .
Lemma 1.
For all X and Y , we have X ←→ (X Y ) ←→ Y , i.e., the sequence X, X Y, Y is a Markov chain 3 .
Proof.
For all x ∈ X -the range of X-and k = f (x), we have P Y |X=x,K=k = P Y |K=k , and, hence,
We will now show that K = X Y is the part of X that a player who knows Y can verify to be correct. Lemma 2 shows that every K a player knowing X can construct that has the same joint distribution with Y as the actual K must indeed be identical with K. Lemma 3 shows that from K, a random variable X can be constructed which has the same joint distribution with Y as X. Hence, K is the largest part of X that someone knowing Y can verify to be correct.
Lemma 2. Let X, K, K, and Y be random variables such that K = X Y , Y ←→ X ←→ K, and P KY = P KY hold. Then we have K = K.
Let us have a look at a value k for which P Y |K=k cannot be expressed as a linear combination of P Y |X=xi for x i ∈ X with f (x i ) = k. (It is easy to see that such a k must exist.) Let S be the set of all x with f (x) = k. In order to achieve P Y |K=k = P Y |K=k , no x not in S can be mapped to k by P K|X . Since
We remove the elements of S from X , repeat the same argument for the next k, and continue this process until X is empty. Hence, P K|X maps all x to f (x), and K = K holds.
2 Lemma 3. Let X and Y be random variables, and let K = X Y . There exists a channel P X|K -which is equal to P X|K -such that P XY = P XY holds, where
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we get
The simulatability condition, which allows for determining the possibility of secret-key agreement over unauthenticated channels, was defined in [22] and further analyzed in [24] . It defines whether given Z, it is possible to simulate X in such a way that someone who only knows Y cannot distinguish the simulation of X from the true X. Definition 4. Let X, Y , and Z be random variables. Then X is simulatable by Z with respect to Y , denoted by
if there exists a conditional distribution P X|Z such that P XY = P XY holds, where
K is a function of X and can be simulated whenever the same holds for X. On the other hand, let P K|Z be a channel that simulates K. It follows from Lemma 3 that there exists a channel P X|K -which is equal to P X|K -such that the channel P X|Z := P X|K P K|Z simulates X.
2
Proof. Suppose first that we have sim
. There must exist a channel PXŶ |Y such that PXŶ Z = P XY Z holds, where
Because of Z ←→ Y ←→Ŷ and PŶ Z = P Y Z , we have Z ←→ Y ←→K and PK Z = P KZ . It follows from Lemma 2 thatK = K holds. From Lemma 1 follows that P Y |KZ = P Y |K . We also have PX |KŶ = PX |Ŷ . Now,
It follows that P X|Y Z = PX |Ŷ Z = PX |Ŷ = P X|Y holds and, hence, X ←→ Y ←→ Z. Suppose now that we have X ←→ Y ←→ Z. It follows P X|Y Z = P X|Y . Let PXŶ |Y := P XY |Y . We get
3 Pseudo-Signature Schemes
The Case of Three Players
We will state the exact condition under which a PSS can be set up from correlated pieces of information. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let P XY Z be the probability distribution of three random variables X, Y , and Z. Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. There exist two channels P X|X and PXŶ |Y such that P XY = P XY and P XY Z = PXŶ Z hold, where P XY = x P XY P X|X , P XY Z = x P XY Z P X|X , and
Proof. Lemma 5 implies that 2. and 3. are equivalent. In the following we will prove that 1. and 2. are equivalent.
Assume that 1. is true. We have sim
. Assume now that 2. is true. Hence, there exists a channel P KY |Y such that P KY Z = P KY Z holds for K := X Y . Lemma 3 implies that there exists a channel P X|K -which is equal to P X|K -such that P XY = P XY holds. We set PXŶ |Y := k P X|K P KY |Y and P X|X := k P X|K P K|X to get
Our pseudo-signature protocol makes use of typical sequences. Intuitively, a sequence of independent realizations of a random variable is typical if the actual rate of occurrences of every specific outcome symbol in the sequence is close to the probability of this symbol.
Definition 5. [3, 9] Let X be a random variable with distribution P X and range X , let n > 0 be an integer, and let γ > 0. A sequence x n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n is called (strongly) γ-typical if, for all a ∈ X , the actual number N (a, x n ) of appearances of a in x n satisfies
It is a consequence of the law of large numbers that for every γ > 0, sufficiently long sequences of independent realizations of a random variable are γ-typical with overwhelming probability. Theorem 1. [3, 9] Let X n = X 1 · · · X n be a sequence of n independent realizations of the random variable X with distribution P X and range X , and let
The following protocol allows P 1 for signing a bit along the transfer path P 1 → P 2 → P 3 .
Lemma 4 implies that there must exist δ > 0 such that for all channels P L|Y , the statistical distance between the distributions P LZ and P LZ is at least δ.
Let n be an even integer, and let (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let γ > 0 be a security parameter and n be large enough. Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know (X 1 , . . . , X n ), (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ), and (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ), respectively. Let, finally, m ∈ {0, 1} be the value P 1 wants to sign.
-P 1 calculates K i := X i Y i and sends (m, K 1+(n/2)m , . . . , K n/2+(n/2)m ) to P 2 . -P 2 checks whether the received K i and the corresponding Y i are a γ-typical sequence with respect to P KY . If so, he accepts, calculates
. . , L n/2+(n/2)m ) to P 3 . -P 3 checks whether the received L i and the corresponding Z i are a δ/2-typical sequence with respect to P LZ . If so, he accepts.
. . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let P 1 be able to send messages to P 2 , and
does not hold and n is large enough, then Protocol 1 achieves PSS for the three players with the transfer path P 1 → P 2 → P 3 .
Proof. We prove that Protocol 1 implements a PSS. First of all, it follows from Theorem 1 that the value from a correct sender P 1 is accepted by P 2 except with exponentially small probability. If P 2 is correct and accepts a value and if γ is small enough, Lemma 2 implies that P 1 must indeed have sent an arbitrarily large fraction (for sufficiently large N ) of correct values
(Note that the knowledge of the values X j for j = i do not help P 1 to cheat since they are independent of X i and Y i .) Therefore, also an arbitrarily large fraction of the values
Z i are correct and-if P 3 is correct-P 3 will accept the values L i sent to him by P 2 (except with exponentially small probability). P 2 , however, cannot (except with exponentially small probability) send any other value than the one sent by P 1 . Indeed, his ability to do so would imply the existence of a channel P L|Y such that P LZ and P LZ are identical (see the proof of Lemma 6 in [23] ); such a channel, however, does not exist because of the assumption stated at the beginning of the protocol.
We now show that the condition of Theorem 2 for the achievability of a PSS among three players is tight, in other words, that sim
imply that no PSS with signer P 1 is possible. In order to demonstrate impossibility, we use a similar technique as in [14] . There, the impossibility of broadcast among three players secure against one corrupted player was shown by analyzing a related system obtained by copying some of the players and rearranging the original players together with their copies in a specific way. Y 1 , Z 1 ) , . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let the players be connected by pairwise secure channels.
If
hold, then there does not exist-for any n-a PSS for the three players with any transfer path and with P 1 as the signer.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a protocol among the players P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 that achieves a PSS for the three players with transfer path P 1 → P 2 → P 3 . From Lemma 6, it follows that there exist channels P X|X and PXŶ |Y such that P XY = P XY and P XY Z = PXŶ Z hold, and P X |X and PX Ẑ |Z such that P XZ = P X Z and P X Y Z = PX YẐ hold.
Let P 1 be an identical copy of P 1 . We now rearrange the four players P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , and P 1 in the following way to form a new system. The analysis of that system then reveals that no PSS among the three original players is possible. Note that, in the new system, no player is corrupted: It is rather the arrangement of this new system that simulates corruption in the original system towards the players in the new system.
-P 1 is still connected to P 2 as originally, but disconnected from P 3 , i.e., all messages P 1 would send to P 3 are discarded and no message P 3 would send to P 1 is ever received by P 1 . -P 2 is still connected to P 1 and P 3 as in the original system. -P 3 is still connected to P 2 as originally, but disconnected from P 1 . Instead, P 3 is connected to P 1 : All messages that P 3 would send to P 1 are delivered to P 1 instead, and all messages P 1 would send to P 3 are indeed delivered to P 3 . -P 1 is connected to P 3 as originally, but disconnected from P 2 . Furthermore, instead of X i , let P 1 have input X i and P 1 have input X i . Let them execute their local programs defined by the PSS protocol, where P 1 signs the message m and P 1 signs the message m .
-Since P XY = P XY holds, the joint view among P 1 and P 2 is indistinguishable from their view in the original system where P 1 holds input m and P 3 is corrupted in the following way: P 3 cuts off communication to P 1 , simulates P 1 using the channel PX Ẑ |Z to produce the valuesX andẐ , and acts towards P 2 as if communicating with P 1 instead of P 1 (indistinguishability follows from P X Y Z = PX YẐ ). Hence, by the correctness property, P 2 must accept m as signed by P 1 . -The joint view of P 2 and P 3 is indistinguishable from their view in the original system where P 1 is corrupted in the following way: P 1 simulates player P 1 , uses the channel P X|X for his own and the channel P X |X for P 1 's input, and acts towards P 3 as P 1 . Thus, by the transferability property, P 3 must accept the transfered message m from P 2 . -Since P XZ = P X Z holds, the joint view of P 1 and P 3 is indistinguishable from their view in the original system 4 where P 1 holds input m and P 2 is corrupted in the following way: P 2 cuts off communication to P 1 , simulates P 1 using the channel PXŶ |Y to produce the valuesX andŶ , and acts towards P 3 as if communicating with P 1 instead of P 1 (indistinguishability follows from P XY Z = PXŶ Z ). Hence, by the unforgeability property, P 3 must reject the signature transferred to him by P 2 .
However, this is impossible since P 3 cannot accept and reject m at the same time. The proof for the transfer path P 1 → P 3 → P 2 is analogous. Hence, there does not exist a PSS for any transfer path.
If the condition of Theorem 3 does not hold, then there exists a transfer path-namely either P 1 → P 2 → P 3 or P 1 → P 3 → P 2 -for which Theorem 2 can be applied. Therefore, the bound of Theorem 3 is tight, and we can state the exact condition under which a PSS for three players and a designated signer exists. (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ) , . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let the players pairwisely be connected by secure channels.
Theorem 4. Let
There exists a PSS for the three players with transfer path
Application of Lemma 5 leads to the following corollary.
be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let the players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. There exists a PSS for the three players with transfer path
We will now present a special case of noisy channels among three players for which our PSS works. This special case is related to the "satellite scenario" of [21] for secret-key agreement.
Corollary 2. Let R be a binary random variable and let X, Y , and Z be random variables resulting from the transmission of R over three binary symmetric channels with error probabilities ε X , ε Y , and ε Z , respectively, such that 0 ≤ ε X < 1/2, 0 < ε Y < 1/2 and 0 < ε Z < 1/2 hold. Let (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples generated independently this way. Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 be three players and assume that they know X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let, finally, the players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. Then, for large enough n, there exists a PSS for the three players with arbitrary transfer path.
Proof. We have that X Y , X Z and X are-up to renaming-equal, and
Corollary 3. Let the players P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 be connected by a noisy broadcast channel. This is a channel for which P 1 has an input bit X, and P 2 and P 3 get output bits Y and Z, respectively, which result from sending X over two independent noisy channels with error probabilities 0 < ε Y < 1/2 and 0 < ε Z < 1/2. Then a PSS for the three players with arbitrary transfer path can be realized.
Proof. Let the transfer path be P 1 → P 2 → P 3 . P 1 sends n random bits over the channel. Both P 2 and P 3 check whether the received values are indeed random, that is, whether they are γ 2 -and γ 3 -typical. The values γ 2 and γ 3 are chosen such that even if P 1 cheats, P 2 does not accept if P 3 does not either-except with small probability. The resulting joint distribution satisfies the condition of Corollary 2. 2
The Case of More than Three Players
Theorem 2 can be generalized to p > 3 players in a natural way. Assume that p players P 1 , . . . , P p want to implement a PSS along the transfer path
. . , X p n ) be n lists distributed independently according to P X 1 ···X p . Let player P j know the values X i , to P 3 . Now P 3 can check the signature and, if he accepts, sign the value m himself, and so forth. Note that the security parameter for every signature must be less restrictive than the previous one, because some of the received K j i may have been faulty. Nevertheless, the error probability remains exponentially small in n. Player P j is not able to forge a signature if
does not hold. Hence, we get the following theorem.
. . , X p n ) be n lists distributed independently according to P X 1 ···X p . Let P 1 , . . . , P p be p players, and let P j know all the X j i . Assume that for all i, player P i can send messages to P i+1 in a secure way (where P p+1 = P 1 ). Let
Then, for large enough n, there exists a PSS for p players with the transfer path P 1 → · · · → P p and tolerating one corrupted player if there does not exist j ≥ 2 with
Broadcast and Multi-Party Computation
The Case of Three Players
We will now apply the results of Section 3 and state the exact condition under which broadcast is possible for three players.
. . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Assume that P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let all players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. If n is large enough and
does not hold, then there exists a broadcast protocol for three players with sender
does not hold, it is possible to set up a PSS with either the transfer path P 1 → P 2 → P 3 or P 1 → P 3 → P 2 . It was shown in [16] that this is sufficient to construct a broadcast protocol for three players.
. . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Assume that P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let all players pairwisely be connected by secure channels.
hold, then there exists no broadcast protocol (for any n) for three players with sender P 1 .
Proof. From Lemma 6, it follows that there exist channels P X|X and PXŶ |Y such that P XY = P XY and P XY Z = PXŶ Z hold, as well as P X |X and PX Ẑ |Z such that P XZ = P X Z and P X Y Z = PX YẐ hold.
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we duplicate the sender P 1 and rearrange the four resulting players in the following way: We disconnect P 1 and P 3 but connect P 3 to P 1 instead, whereas P 2 stays connected as originally. P 1 gets input X i , constructed by applying the channel P X|X on X i . P 1 gets input X , constructed by applying the channel P X |X on X i . P 2 gets input Y i , and P 3 gets input Z i . We give P 1 and P 1 two different inputs m and m and let them all execute the protocol; they all output a value. We now consider three scenarios of an original system involving some of the players P 1 , P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 of the new system obtained by interconnecting all four players as described above.
-Let P 1 and P 2 be correct and P 3 be corrupted. Using his variables Z i , P 3 can produceX i andẐ i such that P 2 cannot distinguish them from X i and Z i . Furthermore, P 2 cannot distinguish X i , which he receives from P 1 , from X i . P 3 simulates P 1 , giving him the valuesX i as input, and using the valueŝ Z i himself. -Let P 1 and P 3 be correct and P 2 be corrupted. Using his variables Y i , P 2 can produceX i andŶ i such that P 3 cannot distinguish them from X i and Y i . Furthermore, P 3 cannot distinguish X i , which he receives from P 1 , from X i . P 2 simulates P 1 , giving him the valuesX i as input, and using the valueŝ Y i himself. -Let P 2 and P 3 be correct and P 1 be corrupted. Using his variables X i , P 1 can produce X i and X i . He can simulate player P 1 with X i as input and use X i for himself.
The joint view of the players P 1 and P 2 in the new system is indistinguishable from their view in the first scenario, and they must thus output m. The joint view of the players P 1 and P 3 in the new system is indistinguishable from their joint view in the second scenario, and they, therefore, output m . But also the joint view of players P 2 and P 3 in the new system is indistinguishable from their view in the third scenario, and thus they must agree on their output value, which contradicts what we derived above. Therefore, no broadcast protocol can exist. 2
Using Theorems 6 and 7 we can now state the exact condition under which broadcast and MPC among three players are possible. Y 1 , Z 1 ) , . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let all players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. Broadcast with sender P 1 is possible if and only if
holds.
Corollary 4. Let (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let all players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. Broadcast with sender P 1 is possible if and only if
Lemma 7. Given three players P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 , connected pairwisely by secure channels and additionally by broadcast channels from P 1 to {P 2 , P 3 } and from P 2 to {P 1 , P 3 } (but no other primitive such as a PSS among the players). Then broadcast from P 3 to {P 1 , P 2 } is impossible.
Proof. This follows from a generalization of the proof in [14] , where only pairwise channels are assumed. 2 Theorem 9. Let (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) be n triples distributed independently according to P XY Z . Let P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 know the values X i , Y i , and Z i , respectively. Let all players pairwisely be connected by secure channels. Broadcast with arbitrary sender as well as general multi-party computation secure against one corrupted player are possible if and only if
Proof. The condition is sufficient for the possibility of broadcast because of Theorem 8 and Lemma 7. The achievability of multi-party computation then follows from [1, 26, 10] . Furthermore, since broadcast is a special case of multi-party computation, the impossibility of broadcast immediately implies the impossibility of MPC. 2
